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ARTICLE
BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF
INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION: HOW THE
THREAT OF MEDIATION WILL IMPROVE
PARTIES’ CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & NANCY A. WELSH*
INTRODUCTION
Host nations have long sought foreign direct investment (FDI) to ad-
vance their economies and labor forces. Foreign companies, meanwhile,
have resorted to numerous processes to protect their investments and re-
solve disputes with host states. While the foreign investors no longer rely
on their own governments (or armies) to come to the rescue, investors are
nonetheless often perceived as strong-arming governments—particularly
the governments of developing states—to bend to their will.1
Achieving a balance between nations’ interests in securing needed in-
vestment and in protecting their prerogatives of sovereignty has most re-
cently played out in the realm of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, and the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules were all
created to reduce tensions, provide certainty to investors, and efficiently
resolve any problems.2 In the last twenty years, however, the resulting arbi-
* Andrea Kupfer Schneider is Professor of Law, Director of the Law School Dispute Reso-
lution Program, and Director of the Institute for Women’s Leadership of Marquette University.
Nancy A. Welsh is University Professor, Professor of Law, and Director of the Dispute Resolution
Program of Texas A&M University School of Law. We thank Lexie Ford and Haley Varnadoe for
their excellent research assistance.
1. See Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation
into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (2013) [hereinafter
Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration].
2. See Susan D. Franck, Using Investor–State Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict Man-
agement: An Introductory Guide, 29 ICSID R.: FOREIGN INV. L.J. 66, 70 (2014) [hereinafter
Franck, Introductory Guide]. ICSID was created in 1966 under the World Bank to resolve dis-
putes between investors and states. UNCITRAL is the body under the United Nations tasked with
focusing on trade law. UNCITRAL first created arbitration rules passed by the U.N. General
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tration system has been perceived as unfair, one-sided, and arbitrary, as well
as unduly expensive and time consuming.3 Recently, countries and inves-
tors have responded by promoting and institutionalizing mediation as an-
other option, culminating in the passage of the Singapore Convention.4
But perhaps the move to mediation is not quite the fix—or not the only
fix—this dispute system needs. While mediation would provide a less ad-
versarial forum, we argue that it may not be the only or even the most
effective way to maintain investment and investor relations in host nations.
In fact, some countries have started to realize that they should initiate inter-
nal management of investment relations much earlier in anticipation of the
disputes that will predictably and inevitably arise, and these countries have
experienced very advantageous results. We argue that these internal
processes could and should support what we are calling “stakeholder nego-
tiations”—structured negotiations with relevant stakeholders that include
full discussions of interests and relationships, with sufficient process pro-
tections for the parties, including legal representation. We also argue that
engaging in such stakeholder negotiations could be even more efficient and
cost effective than integrating mediation into investment treaty arbitration.
Perhaps counterintuitively, we also argue that mediation should be made
mandatory—not because that will make the occurrence of mediation more
likely, but because the threat of mandatory mediation will incentivize par-
ties to intervene earlier, negotiate sooner, and negotiate more effectively.
The first section of this article discusses the current system of investor-
state arbitration and how issues of access to justice, threats to national sov-
ereignty, and perceptions of inconsistency and arbitrariness have led to a
crisis of confidence in which countries and investors now raise many con-
cerns about the arbitration system. As discussed in Section II, this has led to
a push for mediation, culminating in changes to treaty provisions and rules
as well as ratification of the Singapore Convention. The third section of the
article, however, notes that even with this push for mediation, not much of
it is occurring. Furthermore, efforts to increase use of mediation have failed
to address concerns such as the political costs of settling cases, the lack of
coordination between state agencies with different portfolios, and the exis-
tence of governmental actors with different jurisdictions and misaligned in-
centives. The fourth section of the article discusses conflict management
tools that could be made more effective by operating “in the shadow” of
mediation, particularly in the shadow of mandated mediation. This section
addresses the tools and systems that have been designed in certain countries
and recommended by the World Bank to better facilitate ongoing relation-
ships and investment. Finally, the article discusses how the threat of
Assembly in 1976, rules updated most recently in 2013. These rules can apply to arbitrations
between private parties, between states, and between states and private parties.
3. See infra Section I.
4. See infra Section II.
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mandatory mediation (i.e., being required by ICSID rules to participate in
mediation before filing an arbitration claim) could encourage the develop-
ment of conflict management systems and structured stakeholder negotia-
tions that respond more effectively to investor-state conflicts, particularly if
the International Bar Association (IBA) rules provide that the mandate for
mediation may be met by the occurrence of stakeholder negotiation that is
supported by these other conflict management tools.
I. THE INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION SYSTEM
Foreign direct investment counts for 1.6 percent of the world econ-
omy, and in developing countries, can have a crucial impact on the domes-
tic economy, with net inflows funding 3.4 percent of the gross product of
low-income nations in 2018.5 Countries cannot afford to lose these invest-
ments. Yet, in the last decade, investors have used investor-state arbitration
to limit, or seek to limit, national policies that countries likely never envi-
sioned as subject to such challenge—e.g., national monetary policies, labor
laws, and even consumer and environmental protection laws.6 How to bal-
ance these interests—protecting sovereignty while also promoting invest-
ment—is an ongoing puzzle. In 1966, the World Bank’s member
governments ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes between States and Nationals of Other States and created ICSID.7
With this creation, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) could refer disputes
to ICSID for conciliation8 or arbitration. Arbitration did not immediately
take hold, but by the 1990s, arbitration under ICSID or the rules proposed
by UNCITRAL had become quite popular.9 This method for resolving dis-
putes between states and investors was written into the vast majority of
5. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS (last visited Aug. 2, 2020).
6. See Susan Franck et al., Inside the Arbitrator’s Mind, 66 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1124–25
(2017) [hereinafter Franck et al., Arbitrator’s Mind]; James M. Claxton, Compelling Parties to
Mediate Investor-State Disputes: No Pressure, No Diamonds?, 20 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 78, 79
(2020).
7. See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps. [ICSID], ICSID Convention, Regulations, and
Rules, at 5, ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ICSID%20Con-
vention%20English.pdf; Andrea K. Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolu-
tion Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697, 714–19 (1999)
(outlining a description of the investor arbitration regime).
8. Ironically, it was assumed that member states would prefer to use conciliation rather than
arbitration. See Claxton, supra note 6, at 99; see also Kun Fan, Mediation of Investor-State Dis-
putes: A Treaty Survey, 2020 J. DISP. RESOL. 327, 339 (2020).
9. The number of registered cases in the last five years range from thirty-eight to fifty-six.
Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps. [ICSID], The ICSID Caseload Statistics (Issue 2020-1), at 7
(2020), https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/Caseload%20Statistics/en/The
%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%282020-1%20Edition%29%20ENG.pdf. The num-
bers of cases by ICSID for specific years are available at the following webpage: The ICSID
Caseload—Statistics, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS. [ICSID], https://icsid.world
bank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID-Caseload-Statistics.aspx.
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BITs.10 Proponents of investor-state arbitration provisions argued that hav-
ing a set dispute-resolution process better maintained relationships and in-
vestments by providing remedies to harmed investors.11 Most importantly,
many commentators at the time argued that these arbitration clauses were
needed to attract FDI in the first place.12
Yet, just as the number of clauses and arbitration cases surged, com-
plaints about the process also started to surface. Critics noted the expense of
pursuing arbitration cases, which often prevented smaller investors from
seeking remedies or forced smaller countries to settle cases rather than incur
the cost of defending their national policies.13 Others noted political chal-
lenges, such as those that occurred when arbitration rulings either cost host
governments millions of dollars (which might be paid or not) or thwarted
what appeared to be legitimate national priorities regarding fiscal or finan-
10. The OECD surveyed a sample of 1660 BITs in 2012 and found that 93 percent of those
treaties had an ISDS clause. Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, OECD Working
Papers on International Investment 2012/02: Dispute Settlement Provisions in International In-
vestment Agreements: A Large Key Sample Survey, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.
[OECD], at 7 (2012). See also, Jeswald Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51
HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 429 (2010) (Estimates are that over 3,000 BITs were signed between 1959
and 2009). And close to 3,000 BITs are still in operation. Claxton, supra note 6, at 96. See also
Gary Born, BITS, BATS and Buts: Reflections on International Dispute Resolution, Speech at the
University of Pennsylvania 2 (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.wilmerhale.com/-/media/files/Shared_
Content/Editorial/News/Documents/BITs-BATs-and-Buts.pdf (estimating over 2,800 BITs in
force in 2013).
11. See Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 74–75, 81.
12. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTER-
NATIVES TO ARBITRATION, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales No.
E.10.II.D.11 (2010) (“Host states wishing to attract and promote foreign investment often seek to
offer predictability to foreign investors by favouring international arbitration as the means for
investors to deal with a dispute.”). But see U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., THE ROLE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, at xi, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, U.N. Sales No. E.09.II.D.20 (2009)
(“IIAs are part of the policy framework for foreign investment . . . . IIAs alone can never be a
sufficient policy instrument to attract FDI [foreign direct investment].”); Jason Webb Yackee, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative
Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 438 (2011) (reporting research suggesting that a nation’s entry
into a BIT does not tend to influence companies’ decisions to invest); Susan Rose-Ackerman &
Jennifer L. Tobin, Do BITs Benefit Developing Countries?, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBI-
TRATION 131, 134–36 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) (concluding that coun-
tries with poor investment environments do not benefit significantly from entering into BITs);
Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 13–23 (2007) (surveying empirical research regarding investment arbitration).
13. See Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 88 WASH. U.
L. REV. 769, 782–90 (2011) (reporting regarding the costs of investment treaty arbitration); Cathe-
rine Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 357
(2007) (observing that while foreign investors have typically hired major international law firms
to represent them in investor-state arbitration, many developing countries have not because of the
expense associated with such representation or for political reasons); Franck, Introductory Guide,
supra note 2, at 77–80; SUSAN D. FRANCK, ARBITRATION COSTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES IN IN-
VESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION (2019).
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cial policy, environmental protection, or other national interests.14 Through-
out the early 2000s, a series of cases caused host countries to revolt by
either ignoring the arbitral awards or using them as the basis to withdraw
from the entire arbitral system.15
The arguments about the usefulness of arbitration processes centered
around four different concerns that we outline below: the expense and delay
of arbitration; the adversarial nature of the process, which results in invest-
ment withdrawal anyway; the contested legitimacy of the system; and, as an
end result, governments’ pushback on the arbitration system by refusing to
comply with arbitral awards or withdrawing from the ICSID system alto-
gether. We explore these briefly in order to understand the advocacy for
mediation and to frame the needs of the parties that might be better met
through conflict management systems implemented earlier in the dispute
and the parties’ structured stakeholder negotiation.
Numerous commentators have noted that as the number of cases in-
creased in the 2000s, the practice of international arbitration became in-
creasingly specialized, high end, and expensive. For the average case, the
cost incurred by each state has been estimated at $8 million,16 with up to
three years required to reach a disposition.17 Often, by the time the case
reached a resolution, both the country and the investor had moved on to
other issues, losing the investment. In some instances, as in the case of
Argentina, which had over fifty cases filed against it after its financial cri-
sis, national governments apparently froze and became unable to deal with
the disputes.18
Even when arbitration resulted in relatively quick resolution, some
commentators noted that the adversarial nature of arbitration proceedings
made it unlikely that the state and investor would be able to work together
14. See Franck et al., Arbitrator’s Mind, supra note 6, at 1124–25; Claxton, supra note 6, at
79.
15. Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 76.
16. “[I]t is estimated by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) that proceedings cost states an average of $8 million and can exceed $30 million, all of
which they have no chance of recovering, whether they win or lose.” M.R. Dahlan & Wolf von
Kumberg, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reconceptionalized: Regulation of Disputes, Stan-
dards and Mediation, 17 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 233, 243 (2017).
17. Wolf von Kumberg, Jeremy Lack & Michael Leathes, Enabling Early Settlement in In-
vestor–State Arbitration: The Time to Introduce Mediation Has Come, 29 ICSID R.: FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 133, 135 (2014).
18. See JOSE E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT 248 (2011) (“In response to this crisis, the Argentine authorities took a num-
ber of other actions which would ultimately prompt the largest number of investor-State claims
directed at a single State in the history of investment treaties. At this writing, Argentina faces
some 40 investor-State claims.”); Derek A. Soller & Laura R. Zimmerman, Argentina’s Delay in
Paying the Suez ICSID Award, BAKER MCKENZIE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://
www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/02/argetinas-delay-in-paying (noting that
the over fifty cases filed against Argentina are more than against any other country and have
resulted in $1.9 billion in awards against it).
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in the future. The investor moved on to other investments, the relationship
became frayed, and the trust between the investor and the state eroded.
Cited in more than one article, the story of Metalclad v. Mexico exemplifies
these problems. After winning a $17 million award against Mexico, the
CEO of Metalclad, Grant Kesler, still bemoaned the process that had ruined
his company’s relationship with the state.19
As cases have proliferated, other concerns with the validity or accu-
racy of rulings have arisen.20 For example, there have been inconsistencies
in the rulings of arbitral panels. Since an arbitral award is not precedential,
each panel can independently determine the law as applied. And while rul-
ings in the vast majority of cases interpret investment laws clearly, in some
notable cases, the panels differed from one another significantly—even
with the same set of facts.21 Furthermore, countries have argued in the past
twenty years that arbitration panels ignore the national interests of countries
and are overprotective of investors and their investments.22
All of this led to a crisis in the last decade as countries chose either not
to sign arbitration provisions, as in the case of Brazil,23 or to withdraw from
ICSID, as in the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.24 Other coun-
tries, like Argentina, never paid the full amount of awards when panels
ruled against them.25 While all these countries are in Latin America (where
the Calvo Doctrine26 is more at play), fears of an entire continent withdraw-
19. Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 79; Dahlan & von Kumberg,
supra note 16, at 252.
20. See Dahlan & von Kumberg, supra note 16, at 239–45 (comprehensive summary of con-
cerns regarding investor-state arbitration).
21. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1558–81
(2005); Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 80–81.
22. Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 464 (2015).
23. See Nancy A. Welsh, Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Kathryn Rimpfel, Using the Theories
of Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Procedural Justice to Reconceptualize Brazil’s Rejection of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 105, 106 (2014).
24. See Jose Carlos Bernal Rivera & Mauricio Viscarra Azuga, Life After ICSID: 10th Anni-
versary of Bolivia’s Withdrawal from ICSID, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 12, 2017), http://arbitra-
tionblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/08/12/life-icsid-10th-anniversary-bolivias-withdrawal-icsid.
25. Argentina Settles Five Outstanding Investment Treaty Arbitration Claims in Historic
Break with Its Anti-Enforcement Stance, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS LLP (Oct. 14, 2013), https://
www.lexology.com/library/document.ashx?g=be9ef922-dcff-49a4-8ac2-1bfac72bbf40; see also
Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 81.
26. The Calvo Doctrine is described as follows:
[T]here are two cardinal principles that constituted the core of Calvo’s theory: “First,
that sovereign states, being free and independent, enjoy the right, on the basis of equal-
ity, to freedom from ‘interference of any sort’ . . . by other states, whether it be by force
or diplomacy, and second, that aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges not ac-
corded to nationals, and that therefore they may seek redress for grievances only before
the local authorities. These two concepts of nonintervention and absolute equality of
foreigners with nationals are the essence of the Calvo Doctrine.”
Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo
Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1169, 1171–72
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ing from the global investment arbitration regime are influential in encour-
aging change.
II. THE INTEGRATION OF MEDIATION INTO THE INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION SYSTEM
In light of this crisis of confidence, the push for mediation began in the
mid-2000s, culminating in several different initiatives designed to integrate
mediation into ISDS. From an institutional perspective, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was the first to begin to
contemplate mediation seriously, exploring its use in a series of white pa-
pers.27 Lawyers and neutrals also started to delve into how mediation could
operate. In 2012, the IBA created its Rules for Investor-State Mediation.28
The International Mediation Institute (IMI) and the American Society of
International Law (ASIL) also started to advocate for alternative processes
to arbitration that would be more effective.29
A. Mediation’s Advantages
Mediation proponents’ arguments responded to complaints regarding
arbitration but also outlined mediation’s advantages. Mediation could be
less expensive and quicker than arbitration. By focusing on interests and
getting the relevant parties to the table, mediation could better protect rela-
tionships and keep investments in host countries. Mediated settlements
would be more legitimate and encourage greater compliance since each
(1995) (quoting DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 19–20 (1955)).
27. Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Mediation and Its Variations, in U.N. CONF. ON TRADE &
DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATIONS II, at 108,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (Susan Franck & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2011)
[hereinafter INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES II]; Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Using Dispute System De-
sign to Add More Process Choices to Investment Treaty Disputes, in INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES
II, at 93; see generally Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, Becoming “Investor-State Medi-
ation,” 1 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFS. 86 (2012) [hereinafter Welsh & Schneider, Becoming]; see,
e.g., Susan Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 161, 180 (2007) (suggesting consideration of mediation for investment treaty conflicts).
Susan Franck’s research played a major role in encouraging this push and UNCTAD’s leadership.
28. Int’l Bar Ass’n [IBA], IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation (adopted Oct. 4, 2012),
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=8120ED11-F3C8-4A66-BE81-
77CB3FDB9E9F; see also Frauke Nitschke, The IBA’s Investor-State Mediation Rules and the
ICSID Dispute Settlement Framework, 29 ICSID R.: FOREIGN INV. L.J. 112, 112 (2014); Anna
Joubin-Bret & Barton Legum, A Set of Rules Dedicated to Investor-State Mediation: The IBA
Investor-State Mediation Rules, 29 ICSID R.: FOREIGN INV. L.J. 17, 21–23 (2014); Anna Joubin-
Bret, International Dispatch: Investor-State Disputes, 20 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 37, 39 (2013).
29. For example, the authors participated in a panel on international investment law, specifi-
cally investment treaties and dispute resolution, at the 2010 Biennial Conference of the American
Society of International Law and the International Economic Law Interest Group, which was held
in partnership with the Minnesota Journal of International Law and the American Society of
International Law-Midwest (ASIL-Midwest) in November 2010.
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party’s consent was needed to reach settlement. Ultimately, the process op-
tion of mediation would keep countries in the ISDS system.30
Mediation provides additional advantages to the parties. If parties are
not caught up in the adversarial system, they are more likely to learn about
each other’s real interests and build trust.31 Mediation can bring more stake-
holders to the table, regardless of formal standing, and these stakeholders
can end up being essential to implementing the settlements that are
reached.32 The settlements themselves can be more creative, more tailored
to the needs of the parties, and more flexible than monetary payments.33
And, by virtue of consent, increased flexibility, and the effects of experienc-
ing a procedurally fair process in which they have a voice,34 the parties are
more likely to comply with the agreements they have reached.35
B. Incorporating Mediation into ISDS
The push for the use of investor-state mediation has continued, with
notable successes. At this time, mediation is incorporated into the dispute-
settlement provisions of an increasing number of international investment
treaties, including both BITs and multilateral investment treaties.36 Indeed,
it is reported that 24 percent of BITs now include such a provision,37 while
many model BITs also encourage the use of mediation or conciliation.38
30. See Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 82–83.
31. Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 82.
32. See Mariana Hernandez Crespo Gonstead, A New Chapter in Natural Resource-Seeking
Investment: Using Shared Decisions System Design (“SDSD”) to Strengthen Investor-State and
Community Relationships, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 551, 595–602 (2016) (describing
community stakeholders’ midstream and downstream participation in resolving investment-related
disagreements or conflicts); see also Chris Carlson, Convening, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 169 (Lawrence Susskind et al.
eds., 1999) (discussing identifying stakeholders as part of the convening function); BARBARA
GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS 261–67 (1989);
BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 225
(2000).
33. See Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 130. But see Guillermo
J. Garcia Sanchez, The Blurring of the Public/Private Distinction or the Collapse of a Category?
The Story of Investment Arbitration, 18 NEV. L.J. 489, 499–503 (2018) (urging that arbitral panels
generally order the payment of pecuniary damages but that the panels can and should be more
creative and fashion equitable remedies).
34. Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 95–102.
35. Id. at 83.
36. See Fan, supra note 8, at 328; CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN ET AL., MEDIATION IN FUTURE
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 3 (Mar. 2020), https://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/
projects/leginvest/academic-forum/papers/2020/isds-af-mediation-paper-16-march-2020.pdf (writ-
ten for the Academic Forum on ISDS Concept Paper 2020/16) (referencing a report from
UNCTAD regarding treaties signed in 2018 that include mediation in their language).
37. Fan, supra note 8, at 331.
38. Id. at 332–33; see also Chunlei Zhao, Investor-State Mediation in a China-EU Bilateral
Investment Treaty: Talking About Being in the Right Place at the Right Time, 17 CHINESE J. INT’L
L. 111, 124–25 (2018) (describing the China Model BIT, which provides for negotiation that
includes mediation).
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The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship specifically references conciliation and mediation as processes that will
meet parties’ obligation to initially seek to resolve their dispute through
consultation or negotiation before pursuing arbitration.39 The Canada-Euro-
pean Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement of 2016 pro-
vides for the use of mediation to resolve investor-state disputes and even
incorporates a code of conduct for mediators and procedural rules.40 In
2016, the Energy Charter Conference adopted the Guide on Investment Me-
diation as well as a Model Instrument on Management of Investment
Disputes.41
Moreover, the creation of a cadre of mediators in this context is also
moving forward. The IMI Investor-State Mediation Task Force developed
and released competency criteria for investor-state mediators in 2016.42 IC-
SID, the Energy Charter Secretariat, and the Centre for Effective Dispute
Resolution began collaborating on the provision of trainings for investor-
state mediators in Washington D.C., Paris, and Hong Kong.43 The Ameri-
can Bar Association’s Dispute Resolution Section offered a special program
on investor-state mediation, including a simulation, to introduce domestic
neutrals to the process.44
In addition, beginning in 2018, ICSID began working on mediation
rules—the first rules specifically designed by an institution providing a fo-
rum for investor-state disputes.45 Under these rules, which are anticipated to
be submitted for approval in 2021, the ICSID Secretariat would be permit-
ted to administer any mediation proceeding that involves an investment and
a state regardless of either the state’s status as a member of ICSID or the
investor’s nationality.46 Meanwhile, in 2019, the Singapore International
Mediation Centre (SIMC) and the China Council for the Promotion of Inter-
national Trade (CCPIT) signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly
develop mediation rules, a case-management protocol, and enforcement
39. Fan, supra note 8, at 335.
40. Id. at 336.
41. Id. at 339; see also ISDS MEDIATION WORKING GRP., UNLOCKING VALUE THROUGH
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: NEW FORMS TO RESOLVE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES 6 (June 16,
2020), https://imimediation.org/download/104/investor-state-mediation-task-force/60233/mwg-
isds-2020-unlocking-value-through-stakeholder-engagement.pdf.
42. INV.-STATE MEDIATION TASK FORCE, INT’L MEDIATION INST., IMI COMPETENCY CRITE-
RIA FOR INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATORS (Sept. 19, 2016), https://imimediation.org/download/104/
investor-state-mediation-task-force/1472/investor-state-mediation-competency-criteria.pdf.
43. ISDS MEDIATION WORKING GRP., supra note 41, at 7.
44. See A Window into the Future: Adding Mediation to the Process Choices in Global
Investment Disputes, Introduction to the Topic & Case Studies, Program at the ABA Section of
Dispute Resolution 15th Annual Spring Conference (Apr. 6, 2013).
45. Fan, supra note 8, at 339–40 (ICSID Mediation Rules and Additional Facility Rules of
Procedure for Mediation Proceedings).
46. See Frauke Nitschke, A Preview of ICSID’s New Investor-State Mediation Rules,
KLEWER MEDIATION BLOG (Jan. 10, 2020), http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/01/
10/a-preview-of-icsids-new-investor-state-mediation-rules.
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procedures, and also to establish a panel of mediators from the jurisdictions
involved with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to resolve disputes
arising out of BRI projects.47 UNCITRAL has also developed a framework
for mediation and is pursuing reforms.48
There has been one more major development. Persuaded by mediation
proponents that investors needed assurances regarding the enforceability of
mediated settlement agreements, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Singapore Convention in 2019. The convention provides for
domestic courts’ use of summary proceedings for the enforcement of medi-
ated settlement agreements in the context of international commercial and
investor-state matters.49 Such proceedings are modeled after those estab-
lished pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Conven-
tion for judicial recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. At this
time, fifty-three states have signed the Singapore Convention, and six have
already ratified it.50
III. LACK OF ACTUAL INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION
Despite all the efforts just described—to incorporate use of mediation
into treaties and rules, to identify and train mediators, to provide for the
expedited enforcement of mediated settlement agreements, and to educate
states and investors regarding mediation through various presentations,
trainings, and simulations51—there is sparse evidence that the process is
47. See Memorandum Signed to Develop Mediation Rules for Disputes over China BRI
Projects, JONES DAY (Feb. 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/02/memorandum-
signed-to-develop-mediation (discussing mediation component of China International Commercial
Court).
48. See United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Me-
diation, 2018, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/mediation/modellaw/commercial_conciliation;
Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform), U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L.,
Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166 (July 30, 2019), https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166.
49. See Hal Abramson, New Singapore Convention on Cross-Border Mediated Settlements:
Key Choices, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES 360,
360–88 (Catharine Titi & Katia Fach Gomez eds., 2019); see also S.I. Strong, Beyond Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 33–38 (2014) (outlining what a new convention would need to include to
promote enforcement); CENTRE FOR INT’L L., NAT’L UNIV. SING., REPORT: SURVEY ON OBSTA-
CLES TO SETTLEMENT OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES (2017).
50. Pitamber Yadav, SINGAPORE MEDIATION CONVENTION INFORMATION DIGEST, https://
www.singaporemediationconvention.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2021); Press Release, United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law, Ghana Signs the United Nations Convention on
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/300
(July 27, 2020), https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2020/unisl230.html.
51. See, e.g., Franck, Introductory Guide, supra note 2, at 66 (overview of mediation and
simulation); Susan D. Franck & Anna Joubin-Bret, Investor-State Mediation: A Simulation, 29
ICSID REV. 90 (2014) (outlining a simulation meant to teach stakeholders how mediation would
work in the investor-state context).
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actually being used in the investor-state context.52 Commentators have de-
scribed utilization of investor-state mediation as “uncommon”53 and “quite
limited,”54 and the ISDS Mediation Working Group recently acknowledged
that “[i]nvestor-[s]tate [m]ediation is new and its effectiveness has not yet
been systematically tested.”55
A. An Example of Mediation
Only one example of investor-state mediation has received explicit
coverage in the media and academic sources. In 2016, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC)56 administered “one of the only known medi-
ations initiated under a bilateral investment treaty,”57 involving a French
company and the Philippines. The mediation, which lasted two and a half
years, occurred after the investor proposed an opt-in mediation to the Phil-
ippines. The investor filed its request for mediation pursuant to article 3 of
the ICC Mediation Rules of 2014 and the IBA Rules for Investor-State Me-
diation of 2012.
The ICC encountered many challenges in administering the mediation,
particularly in bringing the Philippines to the table. For example, it took the
state two months to respond to the request to mediate and ultimately agree
to participate. During those two months, the ICC “had to identify the appro-
priate contact person within the state, to engage them in communication,
52. See Shu Shang, Implementing Investor-State Mediation in China’s Next Generation In-
vestment Treaties, in CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY: BILATERAL, REGIONAL,
AND GLOBAL LAW AND POLICY 504, 515 (Julien Chaisse ed., 2019) (“[W]e must also recognize
that, as a whole, the investor-state mediation mechanism is not often invoked by parties, whatever
the reasons offered to explain such a phenomenon.”).
53. Claxton, supra note 6, at 99; see also James M. Claxton & Carlos J. Valderama, Promot-
ing Investor-State Mediation at the Source by Remodeling Outcome Accountability (manuscript)
(on file with author) (arguing for prioritizing mediation, but also arguing for the centralization of
the management of investor claims, shared responsibility for settlement, and incentives making it
more likely that state agents will enter into settlements).
54. Roberto Echandi & Priyanka Kher, Can International Investor-State Disputes Be Pre-
vented? Empirical Evidence from Settlements in ICSID Arbitration, 29 ICSID REV. 41, 41 (2014).
55. ISDS MEDIATION WORKING GRP., supra note 41, at 10.
56. The International Chamber of Commerce’s rules do not explicitly promote the use of
mediation over arbitration, but the ICC provides sample clauses for parties to insert to encourage
mediation in Belt and Road disputes. Int’l Chamber of Com. [ICC], Guidance Notes on Resolving
Belt and Road Disputes Using Mediation and Arbitration, at 3, https://iccwbo.org/content/
uploads/sites/3/2019/02/icc-guidance-notes-belt-and-road-disputes-pdf.pdf. For example, ICC
sample clause D was created for use by parties who wish to provide for mediation followed by
arbitration if no settlement is reached (creating obligatory mediation), and clause A or B is for the
preservation of the right to mediate before arbitration. Id.
57. Alina Leoveanu & Andrija Erac, ICC Mediation: Paving the Way Forward, in MEDIA-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES 81, 97 (Catharine Titi & Katia
Fach Gomez eds., 2019) (citing Luke Peterson, In an Apparent First, Investor and Host-State
Agree to Mediation Under IBA Rules to Resolve an Investment Treaty Dispute, Inv. Arb. Rep.
(Apr. 14, 2016)); see also Zhao, supra note 38, at 119 n.34; Fan, supra note 8, at 338 (revealing
that the dispute was Systra SA v. Republic of the Philippines, Inc. and arose out of the state’s
failure to pay for services and work in connection with infrastructure projects).
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and ensure that they would provide an answer to the request for mediation,”
which further required coaching the state representatives regarding the me-
diation process, its rules, and the procedure involved.58 Another challenge
was presented by a general election that occurred during the mediation, re-
sulting in a change of administration and therefore a change in the state
representatives at the mediation.
Unfortunately, the mediation did not result in settlement. According to
Alina Leoveanu and Andrija Erac, the process was nonetheless cost effec-
tive and helpful: “[T]he parties achieved significant progress in their negoti-
ations and the mediation proceedings helped them to reestablish
communication, potentially leaving the door open for future business op-
portunities.”59 More generally, commentators have noted that even when
parties do not settle in mediation, the process itself forces communication
that would not otherwise occur, encourages continued communication, and
can narrow the issues in dispute.60
B. Other Mediations in the ISDS Context
Beyond this single case, there is some indication that mediations of
some sort are being used in other cases involving disputes between inves-
tors and states. In Olyana Holdings v. Rwanda, for example, the parties
participated in a company-state local mediation, presumably occurring
before the case was submitted to arbitration.61 It appears that the parties did
not reach a resolution. In Pan African Burkina v. Burkina Faso, the parties
engaged in parallel mediation and arbitration.62 The investors sought arbi-
tration because the mediation did not produce a settlement. Another ICC
mediation successfully resulted in settlement of a very large dispute be-
tween Odebrecht-Tecnimont-Estrella Consortium and the Dominican Re-
public and its state-owned electricity company, Corporación de Empresas
Eléctricas Estatales (CDEEE), arising out of the construction of a 752-
megawatt thermoelectric-generation plant at Punta Catalina.63 However, it
58. Leoveanu & Erac, supra note 57, at 98.
59. Id. Leoveanu and Erac also note that the mediation was cost efficient, with a cost of
$40,000 for a dispute involving $2.5 million at issue. Id.
60. See Mark Baker & Cara Dowling, Interest in Investor-State Mediation Is Growing, 8
INT’L ARB. REP. 22, 23 (June 2017); Christina G. Hioureas, The Singapore Convention on Interna-
tional Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation: A New Way Forward?, 37 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 215, 224 (2019).
61. See KESSEDJIAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 10.
62. See id.; see also Emma Farge, Timis Companies Seek $385 Million from Burkina Faso in
Mining Dispute, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2016), https://es.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN13V0VL (report-
ing on request for mediation with Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation Centre of
Ouagadougou).
63. See FOLEY HOAG, Foley Hoag Helps Dominican Republic and State-Owned Entity
CDEEE Reach Agreement in ICC Mediation Concerning Central Termoeléctrica Punta Catalina
Project (Mar. 20, 2020), https://foleyhoag.com/news-and-events/news/2020/march/foley-hoag-
helps-dominican-republic-and-state-owned-entity-cdeee-reach-agreement-in-icc-mediation-con
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is not clear that any of these three mediations were formal investor-state
mediations occurring pursuant to investment treaties.
Despite the extraordinarily small number of success stories—and, re-
ally, the difficulty in finding stories of any kind—about actual investor-
state mediations, some quantitative data indicate mediation’s occasional
use.64 In 2019, the Singapore Ministry of Law commissioned the Singapore
International Dispute Resolution Academy (SIDRA) to conduct an interna-
tional dispute-resolution survey.65 The researchers specifically asked the re-
spondents, all corporate users or outside legal counsel, about their use of
dispute-resolution processes for cross-border disputes.66 Of course, this
more general question included mediation of investor-state matters. Al-
though almost half of the respondents indicated that they had been involved
in an investor-state or multilateral investment dispute between 2016 and
2018,67 only 21 percent indicated that they had used ad hoc or institutional
mediation in the investor-state context.68  These responses provide some
additional evidence of the use of investor-state mediation, but the numbers
continue to be quite small.
After reporting that the top four factors influencing its survey respon-
dents’ choice of an investor-state dispute-resolution process were enforce-
ability, political sensitivity, impartiality, and transparency,69 SIDRA
observed that users’ responses indicated the need for reforms and expressed
optimism about mediation’s future as one of these reform measures: “De-
spite the dominance of arbitration in this field, users indicated an openness
to selecting other dispute settlement mechanisms in investor-state matters
such as litigation and mediation.”70 SIDRA noted, however, a discrepancy
between client users and legal users, with client users dramatically more
cerning-central-termoelectrica-punta-catalina-project; The Dominican Government and the
Odebrecht-Tecnimont-Estrella Consortium Reach Agreement to Settle All Existing Disputes and
Guarantee Completion and Final Delivery of the Coal-Fired Central Termoeléctrica Punta Cata-
lina Project (CTPC), BUSINESSWIRE (Mar. 17, 2020, 4:23 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20200317005791/en.
64. It has been reported that the ECT cases have used mediation or conciliation and that the
ECT has published data regarding these cases. However, we have been unable to locate these data.
KESSEDJIAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 8.
65. See SING. INT’L DISP. RESOL. ACAD., SING. MGMT. UNIV. SCH. L., SIDRA INTERNA-
TIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SURVEY: 2020 FINAL REPORT vi (2020), https://sidra.smu.edu.sg/
sites/sidra.smu.edu.sg/files/survey/index.html [hereinafter SIDRA].
66. Id. at 1. Of the 304 respondents, 64 percent (or 194) were lawyers or legal advisors, and
36 percent (or 110) were corporate executives or in-house counsel. Id. at 3.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. Respondents reported that they used ad hoc mediation (14 percent) more frequently
than institutional mediation (7 percent). The authors of the report suggest that “[t]his may reflect
the fact that mediation occurs on an ad hoc basis within the framework of institutional arbitra-
tion.” Id. at 17. Client users also were much more likely than legal users to report choosing to use
ad hoc or institutional mediation. Id.
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id. at 16.
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likely than legal users to express attraction to mediation.71 SIDRA specu-
lated that this discrepancy might be the result of client users’ greater inter-
est in “maintain[ing] business relationships with host states” and
“avoid[ing] lengthy and expensive arbitration proceedings, compared with
[l]egal [u]sers’ familiarity and level of comfort with arbitration and their
lack thereof in relation to mediation.”72
To address the current paucity of information regarding the use of in-
vestor-state mediation, one commentator has called upon dispute-resolution
institutions to begin publishing data regarding their administration of inves-
tor-state mediation, anonymized as necessary,73 and reporting, to the extent
possible, on successful mediations.74 Despite these and other calls75 and
required publication of a register for each arbitration and conciliation pro-
ceeding, ICSID’s proposed Additional Facility Rules provide for only vol-
untary publication of the fact of mediation, the parties, and the mediators.76
C. Obstacles to Increased Use of Mediation
There may be an opening for greater use of investor-state mediation.
There certainly are treaty provisions and rules to facilitate its use, and more
rules are on the way. It is reported that mediation has surpassed arbitration
to “become by far the most popular dispute-resolution process for interna-
tional commercial disputes.”77 Some predict that mediation will be “at the
71. SIDRA, supra note 65, at 26 (“[ ] 80% of Client Users ranked ‘ability to use mediation’
as ‘extremely useful’ or ‘useful’ while only 48% of Legal Users thought ‘ability to use mediation’
would be ‘extremely useful’ or ‘useful.’”).
72. Id.
73. See Claxton, supra note 6, at 93.
74. Id. at 98.
75. See Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2543, 2547 (2014)
(noting the lack of data regarding the use of mediation or other processes to achieve amicable
resolution).
76. See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disps. [ICSID], Proposals for Amendment of the
ICSID Rules, Regulation 3 at 228 (Working Paper No. 4, Feb. 2020); see also ANA UBILAVA &
LUKE NOTTAGE, ICSID’S NEW MEDIATION RULES: A SMALL BUT POSITIVE STEP FORWARD 3,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/amendments/public-input/Ubilava_Notage_
10.17.2018.pdf. The EU-Singapore FTA provides that “[m]utually agreed solutions shall be made
publicly available. However, the version disclosed to the public may not contain any information
that a Party has designated as confidential. . . . [A]ll steps of the mediation procedure, including
any advice that may be given or solution that may be proposed, are confidential. However, each
Party may disclose to the public the fact that mediation is taking place.” 2019 O.J. (L 294) 15.5.6,
15.7.3. “The confidentiality obligation described in Article 10(2) shall not extend to: a) the fact
that the parties have agreed to mediate or a settlement resulted from the mediation unless the
parties agree otherwise in writing; b) the terms of a settlement or partial settlement, unless and to
extent that the parties otherwise agreed in writing[.]” IBA, supra note 28, at art. 10.3.
77. Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, supra note 75, at 2551 (citing Rafal Morek,
What’s ‘New’ in the New ICC Mediation Rules?, KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (Dec. 9, 2013), http:/
/kluwermediationblog.com/2013/12/09/whats-new-in-the-new-icc-mediation-rules) (stating that
over 90 percent of ICC cases filed since 2001 have resorted to mediation).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST213.txt unknown Seq: 15  3-JUN-21 12:39
2021] BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION 387
very center” of BRI dispute resolution.78 Discussions within UNCITRAL
indicate “an appetite, from both investors and States, for prevention of dis-
putes among them.”79
However, it is also important to acknowledge the existence of many
obstacles to the increased incidence of investor-state mediation. First, with-
out success stories or reliable data regarding the use of mediation, it will be
difficult to increase many investors’ and states’ awareness and understand-
ing of the process.80 Second, if mediations occur only after disputes have
clearly crystallized, the process may take on some of the elements of a
confrontational process rather than a consensual one.81 Third, in many
states, there is not yet a formal legal framework to support mediation and
mediated settlements.82 Fourth, and relatedly, there is often a lack of coor-
dination among the various governmental actors that need to be involved—
local versus national, investment-focused versus regulatory—and there is
also a lack of alignment in terms of incentives.83 Fifth, and probably most
important of all, state actors are likely to shy away from a process that has
the potential to reveal their direct responsibility for negotiating settlements
that may be unpopular. If citizens are unhappy with these agreements, they
are likely to accuse the officials of weakness at best and corruption at
worst.84 State actors may see it as better to blame results on a panel of
arbitrators.85
These obstacles have led a number of commentators to urge that medi-
ation be made mandatory rather than voluntary—or at least that certain ele-
78. Peter H. Corne & Matthew S. Erie, China’s Mediation Revolution? Opportunities and
Challenges of the Singapore Mediation Convention, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 28, 2019), http://opinio
juris.org/2019/08/28/chinas-media-revolution-opportunities-and-challenges-of-the-singapore-medi
ation-convention.
79. KESSEDJIAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 2.
80. There may be a need to use success stories from other, related contexts—e.g., non-inves-
tor-state mediations or facilitations that nonetheless involve disputes between governments and
private actors over major infrastructure projects or the results of regulatory actions. See Lester
Levy, Case Study 4: Sequenced Regulatory and Insurance Negotiations, ENV’T ADR, https://
environmentaladr.com/case-studies/sequenced-regulatory-and-insurance-negotiations (last visited
Oct. 22, 2020) (case study of a Superfund dispute); see also ENERGY ADR F., USING ADR TO
RESOLVE ENERGY INDUSTRY DISPUTES: THE BETTER WAY 14–18 (Oct. 2006) (giving case study
examples of energy-sector mediations). Further exploration of this possibility is beyond the scope
of this paper.
81. ISDS MEDIATION WORKING GRP., supra note 41, at 8; see also von Kumberg et al., supra
note 17, at 133 (observing that as parties focus their attention on a court or tribunal, they tend to
stop communicating cooperatively).
82. ISDS MEDIATION WORKING GRP., supra note 41, at 8.
83. See Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, supra note 75, at 2548 (regarding coor-
dination required among government agencies and their different incentives).
84. Id. at 2558; von Kumberg et al., supra note 17, at 134 (acknowledging state actors’
“transparency and personal liability concerns”).
85. See, e.g., So. Pac. Props. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (H.K. v. Egypt),
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3 (1992) (The Egyptian Prime Minister chose to proceed with arbitration
rather than agree to a negotiated settlement of $10 million. The arbitral panel later issued an award
of $32.6 million against Egypt.); Dahlan & von Kumberg, supra note 16, at 253.
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ments of mediation be made mandatory—before a dispute can be submitted
to arbitration. We will return to these proposals for mandatory mediation
later. At this point, we will consider the other mechanisms that exist to
enable investors and states to resolve their disputes earlier, more quickly,
and less expensively, as well as confidentially and in a manner that is tai-
lored to the parties’ and key stakeholders’ needs.
IV. OTHER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TOOLS
In the last decade, the push for mediation and the frustration with arbi-
tration have fueled innovation in conflict management overall. The desire to
intervene earlier, protect relationships, and keep investments has promoted
individual countries’ design of creative structures. In this section of the arti-
cle, we outline some of those structures and suggest how normalizing these
innovations and using them to support structured stakeholder negotiation
could actually meet the needs of investors and countries as well as, or even
better than, mediation.
A. Examples of Innovative Structures
The World Bank has, for years, been studying how to keep FDI in
countries and reduce the likelihood of investment withdrawal. More re-
cently, it has highlighted individual countries’ efforts and has piloted sev-
eral projects to learn how countries can better manage disputes with
investors.
South Korea, for example, has long been hailed as a country at the
vanguard of recognizing the importance of conflict management. In 1999,
the country established its Foreign Investment Ombudsman System (FIOS),
which was strengthened with additional powers in 2012. FIOS was created
to address and resolve foreign investors’ grievances by providing what has
been termed “aftercare” services. These are services that countries can offer
to investors after they have made their initial FDI and are designed to keep
investors satisfied and maintaining, or even expanding, their investments. In
South Korea, for example, FIOS resolved 269 cases in 2018,86 involving
issues ranging from labor relations to immigration to investment incentives.
Most importantly, because investors are aware of the office and the office
itself is empowered to act on behalf of the government, disputes involving
these issues are resolved quickly, efficiently, and early, without the need to
proceed to a legal filing.
Noting the success of South Korea’s FIOS, the World Bank began to
create a tool called the Systemic Investment Response Mechanism (SIRM),
which could operate under several models, depending on the model that a
country chooses to adopt. In each case, the SIRM is designed to intervene
86. World Bank Grp. [WBG], Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment: Polit-
ical Risk and Policy Responses, at 74 (2019) [hereinafter WBG II].
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early in disputes and help resolve them. It would do this by identifying
patterns of government conduct that are problematic and measuring the af-
fected investment (i.e., the likely losses if disputes continued) to demon-
strate to the government the need for intervention and to help government
agencies reduce the likelihood of repeated violations.87
The SIRM pilot process is multilayered, with research and diagnostics
to help each country customize its approach to conflict management. While
there are different possible models for a SIRM, the World Bank recom-
mends establishing a lead agency to coordinate a country’s response to in-
vestor-state disputes. This could be a new independent lead agency (like
South Korea’s FIOS), an existing investment-promotion agency (IPA) that
already includes an aftercare unit and would add conflict management re-
sponsibilities, or an IPA without an aftercare unit that would work with an
aftercare entity located elsewhere in the government structure.88 In all
cases, SIRMs are designed to track and monitor disputes, filter and priori-
tize grievances, and then prompt the lead agency to engage in interagency
problem solving. And, to build political capital over time, the World Bank
recommends that a SIRM track investment retained in dollars to demon-
strate the SIRM’s value to the government.89 This valuation has already
started with the pilot projects initiated by the World Bank. For example, in
three projects verified to have been retained as a result of the efforts of a
newly established SIRM, $200 million in investments were retained, $20
million was reinvested, and $10 million in cost savings was realized.90
These numbers are, frankly, extraordinary demonstrations of the cost effec-
tiveness of conflict prevention and conflict management tools.
Two last findings from the World Bank study are worth noting. First,
the number of cases involving the use of SIRMs is remarkable as compared
to the number of mediations. During the pilot phase alone, the World Bank
tracked the use of SIRMs in thirty-nine cases. This number contrasts quite
dramatically with the single-digit number of investor-state mediations that
have occurred within the past decade, as described in Section III.91 Second,
the study’s identification of the underlying causes of the disputes is striking.
Of the thirty-nine cases tracked during the pilot programs, twenty-three
were the result of sudden or arbitrary regulatory changes, encompassing
contradictory government actions, lack of transparency, and abuse of au-
thority.92 Such government actions often occur at the subnational level or
87. Id. at 43.
88. Id. at 50.
89. Id. at 55–56.
90. Id. at 58–59.
91. In addition, even the number of conciliations is small compared to the number of cases
using SIRMs. The total number of cases registered since the creation of ICSID in 1966 under the
ICSID conciliation or additional facility conciliation rules is twelve. ICSID, The ICSID Caseload
Statistics (Issue 2020-1), supra note 9,  at 8.
92. WBG II, supra note 86, at 58.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-2\UST213.txt unknown Seq: 18  3-JUN-21 12:39
390 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
through specialized agencies at the national level.93 Therefore, one of the
primary roles of the lead agency under the pilot SIRMs was to coordinate
with other agencies to solve government-caused problems. To do so effec-
tively, the lead agency needs political clout and power to bring the relevant
parties to the table and effectuate negotiations. Indeed, as the World Bank
notes, “[T]he SIRM entails the establishment of a small yet very well-
trained team in investment law and negotiation skills to deal with peer
agencies.”94
Similar to the World Bank and the states that are adopting new conflict
management tools, many global corporations are also keenly interested in
the prevention and improved management of disputes.95 In the corporate
context, just as in the public context, negotiation skills are an essential part
of the picture, and it is to these skills that we turn next as we examine the
elements of structured stakeholder negotiations.
B. What Is Stakeholder Negotiation?
We use the term “stakeholder negotiation” in this article to comprise
several components essential to the success and legitimacy of negotiation in
the investor-state context, in both the short term and long term. Again,
given the concerns regarding arbitration—perceived illegitimacy, unjusti-
fied constraints on national prerogatives, lack of implementation, lost in-
vestment, and ruined relationships—any alternative process must reduce the
likelihood of these problems without creating new ones.
Stakeholder negotiation, by definition, starts with the stakeholders. We
define stakeholders broadly, to include relevant parties at the national and
local levels, investors, and lawyers. Investor-state arbitration has been dom-
inated by lawyers at the national level, long after investors have determined
93. Id. at 59.
94. Id. at 65. It is worth noting here as well the establishment of organizations to assist
investor-state negotiations. See, e.g., Baker & Dowling, supra note 60, at 22 (“The Secretariat of
the Energy Community (an international organization dealing with energy policy, established by
treaty, which brings together the European Union and countries from the South East Europe and
Black Sea regions) has recently established a Dispute Resolution and Negotiation Centre. The
Centre focuses on negotiating and mediating investor-state energy disputes. The Secretariat stated
that institutional mediation has an important role to play in the resolution of investment disputes at
an early stage.”); see also Karl Sauvant, The Case for an Advisory Centre on International Invest-
ment Law, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2019), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2019/10/KPS-The-
case-for-an-Advisory-Centre-on-International-Kluwer-Arbitation-Blog.pdf.
95. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Percep-
tions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations,
19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 23 (2014) (regarding conflict coaching); von Kumberg et al., supra
note 17, at 133, 137–41 (observing that “[o]n the user side, global companies, many of which are
members of the Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group (CCIAG), are looking for
ways to engage in conflict avoidance and better dispute prevention and management processes”
and listing concepts and skills that parties and lawyers should be taught or reminded of, including
model checklists and submissions, with focus on preparing for mediation, but just as relevant to
preparing for structured negotiation).
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the relationship is too broken to repair. In contrast, stakeholder negotiation
must include more parties, the right parties, and sooner. Investors, such as
local managers and the executives who negotiated the original investment,
should be represented. At the national level, governments will want to in-
clude the representative of the IPA or whichever national agency was re-
sponsible (and likely rewarded) for bringing in the investment. Stakeholder
negotiation also will require the participation of the municipal or subna-
tional agency responsible for the allegedly offending law or regulation. This
law or regulation could well have been encouraged by public needs for
funding, local taxes, and protection of the environment and public health, so
organizations that had pushed for the law or regulation should also be
included.96
Moreover, a local environmental dispute, for example, could require
the participation of an even larger group of stakeholders: the regional envi-
ronmental regulator, the mayor of the town where the investment is located,
the leaders of an affected indigenous community, any local or national envi-
ronmental groups, the national government agency in charge of investment
attraction, the investor company (both the local manager on site and the
international executive with the power to change or affect policies), and the
lawyers for each entity. As we outline who is at this table, it should be clear
that this is a much larger table than is typically used in investment arbitra-
tion disputes. The point is that all affected parties—those who have inter-
ests at stake and those who need to be part of any implementation plan, not
just those who can meet the requirements of “standing”—should be at the
table participating together.
Also, while it might seem intuitive under the World Bank’s conception
of SIRMs as discussed above, we want to be clear that the primary role of
the lead agency or ombuds or other SIRM model must be to serve as conve-
nor and get all the needed players to the table to work through the dispute
before it escalates.97 Leaving out some piece of this puzzle will result in
resolutions that are perceived as illegitimate, politically fraught, and ulti-
mately likely to fail. For a municipality to roll back a law, political cover
must be given. Even the absence at the table of the IPA (which perhaps is
seen as an ally of the investor) will result in ongoing disputes, particularly if
96. See Mariana Hernandez Crespo, A Systemic Perspective of ADR in Latin America: En-
hancing the Shadow of the Law Through Citizen Participation, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
91, 110 (2008) (using commercial arbitration with oil companies in the Amazon River Basin as an
example of environmental harm caused by a lack of civic oversight in arbitration); see also Guil-
lermo J. Garcia Sanchez, When Drills and Pipelines Cross Indigenous Lands in the Americas, 51
SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (noting that indigenous groups are often “treated as
externalities” in arbitration).
97. The agency would be behaving in a “quasi-mediator” way by encouraging early commu-
nication and the sharing of information between investors and states, much like Peru’s coordina-
tion and response system, China’s domestic administrative review process, or Colombia’s lead
agency model. Welsh & Schneider, Becoming, supra note 27, at 96.
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the IPA made promises it should not have. By learning where conflict typi-
cally emerges, both national and municipal agencies can better communi-
cate all along the path of recruiting, establishing, expanding, and
maintaining FDI.
What happens once the right parties are at the table in stakeholder
negotiation? Stakeholder negotiation must ensure that the parties’ interests
and relationships are discussed, highlighted, and addressed. Discussion in-
evitably will include consideration of legal claims and defenses, but it can-
not be limited to these topics. Much like mediation, in which participants
are looking for integrative and tailored solutions that will be adhered to,
stakeholder negotiation can produce negotiated settlements that reflect the
same customized approach. To accomplish such settlements, information
must be shared openly, creative solutions talked through, and trust devel-
oped, particularly where state regulations or misunderstandings regarding
an investor’s intent exist as part of the dispute.
With more robust participation by all stakeholders, more information
can be shared and trust can be built among the parties. Realistic and imple-
mentable solutions should be the result. Over time, the early relationships
between investors and IPAs may grow stronger, and similarly strong rela-
tionships may develop between investors and the municipalities in which
they operate. In fact, one of the primary goals of IPAs and SIRMs should be
to make the investor-state relationship more sustainable. Much as a success-
ful marriage is strengthened by learning to engage in conflict productively,
in a manner that enables the partners to learn about each other, long-term
investments will be strengthened by dispute systems that provide for broad
participation and consequent resilience and legitimacy.98
C. The Feasibility of Stakeholder Negotiation
We certainly are not the first to observe that negotiation can, does, and
should resolve many investor-state disputes. But mediation proponents have
criticized negotiation as inevitably “unstructured and prone to failure in par-
ticularly complex disputes,” while maintaining that, in contrast, mediation
offers both “a more-structured interest-based process with a problem-solv-
ing orientation”99 and a changed dynamic due to the third party’s presence
and ability to caucus privately with the parties.100 Mediation proponents
98. Professor Mariana Hernandez Crespo Gonstead has drawn this parallel between marriage
partners and investment/development partners in her presentations and articles. See, e.g., Mariana
Hernandez Crespo Gonstead, A New Dance on the Global Stage: Introducing a Cultural Value-
Based Toolbox to Optimize Problem-Solving, Innovation, and Growth, 34 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 675, 694–95, 703, 715, 744 (2019).
99. Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, supra note 75, at 2553.
100. Id. at 2559; see also Zhao, supra note 38, at 116 (arguing that because negotiation is less
structured, its “procedural predictability is lower” and thus more likely to be affected by power
asymmetries); Dahlan & von Kumberg, supra note 16, at 255 (mediator in better position to
identify impediments to settlement).
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also have taken note of states’ internal reforms. They have maintained not
that these internal reforms could set the stage for more effective negotiation
by the parties, but that these reforms should enable greater coordination by
the states and better preparation for mediation.101
So, is it realistic to think that states, investors, and their lawyers could
engage in these sorts of structured negotiations without the assistance of a
third party? The current frequency of settlement certainly suggests that par-
ties and their lawyers are already negotiating many, many settlements.102 A
hefty percentage of US lawyers appear to be effective integrative negotia-
tors,103 and many lawyers-to-be in the United States (i.e., law students) are
both being introduced to negotiation in their required doctrinal courses
through simulations and discussion104 and developing their negotiation
skills by electing to take courses focused entirely on negotiation.105
Apparently inspired by the theories underlying mediation but disap-
pointed by its implementation, US lawyers have also created new ap-
proaches to legal practice that involve many features similar to those of
stakeholder negotiation. These different approaches go by a variety of
names: collaborative law,106 cooperative law,107 integrative law,108 preven-
101. Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, supra note 75, at 2564.
102. See Echandi & Kher, supra note 54, at 51–52.
103. Catherine H. Tinsley, Jack J. Cambria & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Reputations in Nego-
tiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIA-
TOR 203, 208–09 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006); Gerald
Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 8–9 (1996) (“Even when
complaints are filed in court, approximately ninety percent will be resolved by negotiation without
the need for full trial on the merits.”); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths, 7
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 167 (2002) (“[ ] 91% of lawyers seen as effective took a problem-
solving approach to negotiation.”).
104. See John Lande, Lessons from Teaching Students to Negotiate Like a Lawyer, 15 J. CAR-
DOZO CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 38 n.69 (2013) (explaining that incorporating practical negotiation
skills into interest-specific doctrinal courses may encourage students to utilize legal analysis while
practicing dispute-resolution skills, as was the case with Professor Lande’s Family Dispute Reso-
lution course); see also Praveen Kosuri et al., You Too Can Create a Simulation Exercise (or Even
a Course), 9 TENN. J. BUS. L. 101, 101–04 (2009) (explaining Professor Daniel Jaffe’s Contract
Drafting course, which includes negotiation simulations, then explaining Professor Jeff Leslie’s
Transactional Law course, which includes both substantial law elements and skills-based curricu-
lum on negotiation).
105. See Karen Tokarz & Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, New Directions in Negotiation and
ADR: Introduction, 39 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2012) (noting that courses on negotiation are
present in almost every law school in the U.S., a shift from years past). For example, first-year
students at Texas A&M University School of Law take an intensive ADR Survey course, which
includes mock negotiations, among other ADR simulations.
106. Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State L., Uniform Collaborative Law Rules and Uni-
form Collaborative Law Act, 48 FAM. L.Q. 55, 60 (2014) (published by the American Bar
Association).
107. John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss: Choosing Media-
tion, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV.
280, 281 (2004).
108. Ken Haldenstein, Integrative Law: Law as a Healing Profession, 40 WESTCHESTER B.J.
35, 35 (2015).
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tive law,109 structured negotiation,110 and planned early negotiation.111 In-
deed, Julie Macfarlane has suggested that we are on the verge of the age of
the “New Lawyer.”112 For our purposes, what is important is that these
approaches tend to involve clients directly, elicit and respond to the clients’
underlying interests as well as their legal claims and defenses, and en-
courage creative and accountable problem solving. The goals of mediation
are being brought to these structured, inclusive negotiations.
There is also preliminary empirical evidence from domestic practice in
a few states in the United States that some civil litigators are engaging,
formally or informally, in a form of stakeholder negotiation that includes
their clients in the negotiation of settlements.113 The analysis of one data
set, involving litigants in three different US state courts who settled their
lawsuits through either negotiation or mediation, indicates that clients re-
spond quite favorably when they are included in their lawyers’ negotia-
tions.114 Further, and significantly for this article, this particular data set
indicates that when clients accompany their lawyers to negotiation, they
find the negotiation process to be fairer than mediation (also attended by
both the clients and their lawyers), to produce more satisfactory results than
mediation, and to provide a greater sense of personal control over the out-
come than is true for mediation.115
Just as states and corporations appear eager to be more effective in
problem solving, many lawyers appear eager to do the same. If that is the
case, there might be just as much—or even more—value in focusing on
developing lawyers’ skills and capacities as negotiators (and as negotiation
coaches for their clients) as in focusing on developing and training panels
109. Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law: A
Combined Concentration to Invigorate the Everyday Practice of Law, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 25
(1997).
110. LAINEY FEINGOLD, STRUCTURED NEGOTIATION: A WINNING ALTERNATIVE TO LAWSUITS
1–3 (2016).
111. John Lande, Family Lawyering with Planned Early Negotiation: How You Can Get Good
Results for Clients and Make Money, 37 FAM. ADVOC., no. 3, Winter 2015, at 12, 13.
112. JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: HOW CLIENTS ARE TRANSFORMING THE PRAC-
TICE OF LAW (2d ed. 2017).
113. See John Barkai & Elizabeth Kent, Let’s Stop Spreading Rumors About Settlement and
Litigation: A Comparative Study of Settlement and Litigation in Hawaii Courts, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 85, 108–10 (2014); John Lande, A Framework for Advancing Negotiation Theory:
Implications from a Study of How Lawyers Reach Agreement in Pretrial Litigation, 16 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 20–44 (2014) (providing a case study of fourteen cases, roughly a quarter
of which included negotiations with clients present; several of the cases involved collaborative
law); Donna Shestowsky & Nancy A. Welsh, Behold the Dark Horse: An Empirical Comparison
of Court-Connected Mediation and Negotiation (manuscript on file with authors).
114. Shestowsky & Welsh, supra note 113, at 28; see also Donna Shestowsky, The Psychol-
ogy of Procedural Preferences: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 637, 674 (2014).
115. Shestowsky & Welsh, supra note 113, at 29 (also observing that the presence of lawyer-
clients in the dataset may be partially responsible for certain differences in client perceptions of
mediation compared to negotiation with the clients present).
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of mediators.116 Lawyers should be ready to identify and convene all rele-
vant parties, probe for their own clients’ and others’ key interests, listen
reflectively, and help with effective, creative problem solving. The increas-
ing diversity among lawyers engaged in investor-state dispute resolution
should also help in interest identification and problem solving by providing
a more inclusive range of backgrounds and perspectives at the table.117
D. A New Idea for the Investor-State Context
This article has already noted and praised the World Bank’s work in
supporting the development and operation of SIRMs. The World Bank is
also recognizing the importance of negotiation in this context. However, the
tenor of the World Bank’s recommendations regarding negotiation is quite
different from that of the stakeholder negotiations we describe here. The
World Bank frames the SIRMs’ role in negotiation hierarchically and dual-
istically. In its view, negotiation, or what the World Bank calls interagency
problem solving,118 first starts with the lead agency talking to the “offend-
ing” agency (its words) to get that agency to collaborate.119 The World
Bank envisions negotiation as occurring primarily between the lead agency
and an agency that has promulgated an illegal regulation, and it is important
to note the assumption that it is a state agency’s illegal regulation that is the
triggering cause of many investor-state disputes. According to the World
Bank, the lead agency’s role is to help the offending agency “rethink its
116. See von Kumberg et al., supra note 17, at 137–41 (listing concepts and skills that parties
and lawyers should be taught or reminded of, including model checklists and submissions, with
focus on preparing for mediation); see also Sauvant, supra note 94.
117. Examples of international law firms focusing on increasing the diversity of their lawyers
include the law firms participating in the Move the Needle Fund. MOVE THE NEEDLE FUND, https:/
/www.mtnfund2025.com. Various international firms have also undertaken individual efforts.
See, e.g., White and Case Ranked Most Diverse Among Top 50 US Law Firms, WHITE & CASE
(June 18, 2020), https://www.whitecase.com/firm/awards-rankings/ranking/white-case-ranked-
most-diverse-among-top-50-us-law-firms; Ben Edwards, Freshfields Sets Out Five-Year Global
Diversity and Inclusion Targets, GLOB. LEGAL POST (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.globallegal
post.com/big-stories/freshfields-sets-out-five-year-global-diversity-and-inclusion-targets-1214
4451; Varsha Patel, Freshfields to Factor in Diversity When Building Disputes Teams, LAW.COM
INT’L (Nov. 19, 2020, 6:47 AM), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2020/11/19/fresh
fields-to-factor-in-racial-diversity-when-building-disputes-teams/?slreturn=20210208225717. The
need to increase the diversity of arbitrators selected for investor-state matters has also received
substantial attention. See, e.g., Int’l Council for Com. Arb., Report of the Cross-Institutional Task
Force on Gender Diversity in Arbitral Appointments and Proceedings (2020), https://
cdn.arbitration-icca.org/s3fs-public/document/media_document/ICCA-Report-8-Gender-Diver-
sity_0.pdf; Andrea K. Bjorklund, Daniel Behn, Susan Franck, Chiara Giorgetti, Won Kidane,
Arnaud de Nanteuil & Emilia Onyema, The Diversity Deficit in International Investment Arbitra-
tion, 21 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 410, 410–40 (2020) (focusing on lack of diversity among inves-
tor-state arbitrators and proposing reforms); see also Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration,
supra note 1, at 140–41 (co-mediation as means to increase diversity and inclusivity of mediators
for disputes between investors and host states); Gonstead, supra note 98, at 726–27 (value of co-
mediation to permit inclusion of different cultural values).
118. WBG II, supra note 86, at 53.
119. Id.
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behavior and conduct”120 in light of the rule of law as established through
investment treaties and other domestic legislation. This part of the negotia-
tion is not really a negotiation between all stakeholders. The successful ex-
amples of SIRMs provided by the pilot projects rely on directive models of
influence, e.g., peer pressure, power-based negotiation, rule-based negotia-
tion, and even early neutral evaluation.121
More specifically, peer pressure has worked when agencies already
had a collaborative network involving regular meetings. In these meetings,
the lead agency exerted enough pressure on the offending agency to cause it
to comply.122 Examples of power-based negotiation have involved use of
the prime minister’s office and the lead-agency head’s position at the cabi-
net level of the government. When the offending agency was faced with the
threat of a dispute going to the prime minister, the “mere expectation of
being directly exposed to the disciplinary power of the highest authority of
the government became a lubricant for collaboration.”123 Rule-based nego-
tiations, per the World Bank, are ones in which the threat of arbitration and
liability is used to bring the offending agency in line.124 The World Bank
has also recommended early neutral evaluation by the lead agency, where it
is done quickly, confidentially, and inexpensively.125
All the negotiation strategies outlined by the World Bank to be used by
the lead agency assume a hierarchical, power-based context. Especially in a
hierarchical culture, the lead agency might be able to use power-based strat-
egies to negotiate quick resolutions with local or national offending agen-
cies. But that will not always be case. When power-based strategies are not
culturally appropriate or seem likely to backfire or fail to reach the other
stakeholders needed to produce a sustainable result, stakeholder negotiation
would be available and preferred. Meanwhile, some of the other strategies
recommended by the World Bank—e.g., peer pressure, reality testing re-
garding the likelihood and potential effects of being involved in arbitra-
tion—would likely be part of any negotiation, stakeholder negotiation
included. The benefit of stakeholder negotiation is that it also involves
much more.
V. MEDIATION’S SHADOW . . . OR MEDIATION AS THREAT
As noted above, various commentators have urged that states, treaties,
and international dispute-resolution organizations respond to the apparent
dearth of voluntary use of investor-state mediation by requiring mediation
before disputes may be submitted to arbitration, or at least encouraging par-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 54.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. WBG II, supra note 86, at 54.
125. Id.
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ties to use investor-state mediation by offering financial incentives or re-
quiring parties to participate in instruction regarding mediation.126 There
are ample examples of these strategies’ use in domestic courts around the
world.127 A 2019 survey of investors, conducted by Queen Mary University
of London, even showed that 64 percent of respondents strongly or some-
what favored requiring mediation before parties could commence arbitra-
tion proceedings128 (although follow-up interviews with investors also
revealed substantial concerns about making investor-state mediation
mandatory).129
A. More than Mediation
However, mediation is not the only dispute-resolution mechanism that
would enable parties to resolve their disputes earlier, more quickly, less
expensively, and in a manner tailored to their needs and those of key stake-
holders. Mediation is only a means to reach those ends. It is not an end in
and of itself. And as demonstrated above, mediation’s uptake has been quite
slow. Meanwhile, as further discussed, there are other procedural innova-
tions, such as ombuds, lead agencies, SIRMs, and new approaches to legal
practice and legal negotiations, that states, corporations, and lawyers are
adopting voluntarily and more quickly than mediation. These innovations
do not require the parties to resort to an outside third party. Instead, these
innovations require the parties to take responsibility for some of what they
might otherwise expect the outside third party to handle.
Recently, Jack Coe has written that
[m]ediation is not a stand-alone solution to all that ails the current
system. Rather, it should be part of an overall coordinated set of
strategies that include not only various refinements to prevailing
arbitration regimes and improved precision in the way substantive
treaty protections are delimited, but also more pervasive use of
host-state systems for detecting and managing inchoate
disputes.130
126. Claxton, supra note 6, at 89–91; Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note
1, at 125–26.
127. Claxton, supra note 6, at 87–89; see Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra
note 1, at 88.
128. See also von Kumberg et al., supra note 17, at 136 (indicating that investors are also
inserting mediation into their contracts with states and “increasingly considering whether, as a
condition of entering into a State investment project, they should insist on a dispute resolution
clause that refers disputes to a private dispute resolution institution more inclined to actively help
them manage any conflicts proactively, efficiently and effectively (most privately run interna-
tional arbitration providers now offer mediation services)”).
129. See KESSEDJIAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 10–11.
130. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Concurrent Co-Mediation: Toward a More Collaborative Centre of
Gravity in Investor-State Dispute Resolution, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 61, 78 (Catharine Titi & Katia Fach Gomez eds., 2019).
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We agree. We further agree with Professor Coe that we need to notice
that, despite the many and complicated difficulties involved in reaching set-
tlements of investor-state disputes, “somehow, roughly one out of three in-
vestor-state cases already settle.”131 The parties and their lawyers are
accomplishing this on their own.
Finally, we agree with Professor Coe that the primary challenge today
is in convening the parties—bringing the state, the investor, and other key
stakeholders to the table to begin the negotiation process. And we agree that
meeting this challenge requires “attitudinal changes, reflected in new stan-
dard operating procedures, among states in particular,” with the hope that
“these new habits will generate and reinforce new best practices and new
expectations that will in turn encourage the mastery of new, quite powerful,
techniques.”132
B. The Threat of Mediation as Catalyst
The shadow—or more malevolently, the threat—of mediation may be
quite useful in jumpstarting the convening process. Indeed, the shadow (or
threat) of mediation may even be more useful than the occurrence of media-
tion itself. The threat of an arbitration hearing can focus parties’ thinking
and encourage them to make productive use of mediation. Similarly, the
threat of mediation has the potential to focus parties’ thinking and enable
them and their lawyers to change their attitudes, operating procedures, ex-
pectations, and habits. This is because parties know that the mediator will
ensure that all the right parties are in the room and that those parties com-
municate with each other, discuss their underlying interests as well as their
legal claims and defenses, and problem-solve to try to arrive at mutually
beneficial solutions that hold all parties accountable. Ultimately, the
shadow (or threat) of mandatory investor-state mediation could effectively
establish new international norms for how parties can and should use the
cooling-off periods that are already so common in BITs.133
Therefore, we urge that in its rules, ICSID mandate mediation before
parties may file for arbitration, but we further urge that the mandated pro-
cedure not be limited to mediation alone. Instead, ICSID should permit its
mandate to be met through use of other procedures, particularly stakeholder
131. Id. at 78; see also Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, supra note 75, at 2546
(observing that an estimated 30 to 40 percent of ICSID arbitrations “end through a negotiated
settlement—a number that is certainly dwarfed by the number of conflicts that parties resolve
before arbitration proceedings are even registered”); KESSEDJIAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 8–9
(“[ ] 23% of all known cases (from 1987 to 2018) have settled and 10% have been discontinued
. . . .”).
132. Coe, supra note 130, at 78; see also von Kumberg et al., supra note 17, at 135 (providing
many reasons for delays in resolving investor-state disputes, some of which are related to conven-
ing issues).
133. See von Kumberg et al., supra note 17, at 135–36 (noting the current lack of international
norms for how parties can and should make productive use of the cooling-off period).
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negotiation that includes the essential elements we have identified here. IC-
SID could also specifically mandate the use of either mediation or stake-
holder negotiation, or it could mandate mediation but provide for an opt-out
if the parties can make a sufficient showing that they have engaged in stake-
holder negotiation.134
How will ICSID know that the state and investor have undertaken
stakeholder negotiation in good faith, with sufficient intent to work together
and try to reach settlement? In some sense, ICSID cannot know. But the
question of good faith is not new,135 and it is just as likely to arise with
mediation as with stakeholder negotiation. Domestic US experience may be
instructive on this point. In determining whether parties have participated in
mandated mediation in good faith, US courts have focused on their compli-
ance with certain objective requirements, such as whether the parties have
submitted pre-mediation briefs as required, attended the procedure as re-
quired, and ensured that those in attendance had the required authority.136
For stakeholder negotiation, ICSID could similarly determine whether the
parties exchanged pre-negotiation information (including information re-
garding their interests and the identities of other stakeholders needed to
develop and implement an agreement), attended the negotiation along with
their lawyers, and ensured that those representing the state or a corporate
investor at the negotiation had settlement authority.
The idea that a variety of tools could satisfy a condition precedent is
not new. Certain treaties and side instruments already anticipate that more
than one consensual procedure would be satisfactory. For example, side in-
struments to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership, particularly those between New Zealand on one hand and
Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam on the other, mandate negotiation before the
state will consent to arbitration and also provide that mediation may be used
to meet the negotiation requirement.137 The Investment Agreement for the
134. See Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 1, at 126–27; Zhao, supra
note 38, at 129 (suggesting potential use of opt out if mediation is made mandatory in China-EU
BIT).
135. See Dahlan & von Kumberg, supra note 16, at 259–60 (noting that “previous case law
under the ECT has confirmed that for any arbitral tribunal to have jurisdiction over the dispute,
parties must demonstrate evidence of seriously attempting to reach an amicable settlement”).
136. See Peter N. Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 363, 427–28 (2011).
137. See Claxton, supra note 6, at 91 n.103 (citing Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-
ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership Text and Resources, N.Z. FOREIGN AFFS. & TRADE, https://
www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/comprehensive-
and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-
agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text-and-resources (last visited Oct. 23, 2020); Mainland/
Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), China-H.K, Sept. 29, 2003,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2657/
download; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, Oct. 30, 2016, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf) (noting the attention to defining
the mediation process).
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Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Common In-
vestment Area requires parties to use an alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion during the cooling-off period, providing only that mediation will serve
as the default if the parties cannot reach an agreement on the means to be
used.138 Article 26.1 of the Energy Charter Treaty does not mandate partici-
pation in a consensual process during the cooling-off period, but instead
states that disputes “shall, if possible, be settled amicably.”139 Its mediation
guidelines provide that the treaty language regarding amicable settlement
should be understood to include the use of several alternatives: “good of-
fices, structured negotiation, mediation or conciliation using existing mech-
anisms or even agreeing on a tailor-made mechanism.”140
Our proposal would vary from the examples of mandatory participa-
tion in a dispute-resolution process by providing quite explicitly that stake-
holder negotiation could be used to meet the requirement of mediation.
CONCLUSION
The push for more creative, responsive, and innovative conflict resolu-
tion for investor-state disputes is crucial. We can see that in their treaties,
states are recognizing process options beyond arbitration. The push for me-
diation is well underway. Meanwhile, stakeholder negotiation could occur
even sooner than mediation, it could be less expensive than mediation, and
among certain parties, it could be even more effective.
So why do we nonetheless support mandating mediation? Three pri-
mary reasons argue for this. First, mediation itself might well be needed for
parties or states where SIRMs are not yet established or working well, or
for parties who have made sustained attempts at some form of structured
negotiation and now recognize that they need the help of a third party to
facilitate their conversations. Whether needed because of more challenging
issues or parties, or even lack of time, mandatory mediation has long been
138. Fan, supra note 8, at 336 (citing Article 26, paragraph 4, of the Investment Agreement
for the COMESA Investment Area, which reads in relevant part: “Where no alternative means of
dispute settlement are agreed upon, a party shall seek the assistance of a mediator to resolve
disputes during the cooling-off period required under this Agreement between the notice of inten-
tion and the initiation of dispute settlement proceedings under Articles 27 or 28.” Investment
Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Common Investment Area,
art. 26, 2007, https://www.iisd.org/toolkits/sustainability-toolkit-for-trade-negotiators/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/rei120.06tt1.pdf).
139. Int’l Energy Charter, Energy Charter Treaty art. 26.1, May 20, 2015, https://
www.energychartertreaty.org/provisions/article-26-settlement-of-disputes-between-an-investor-
and-a-contracting-party/261.
140. Int’l Energy Charter, Guide on Investment Mediation, at § 2.1, CCDEC 2016 12 INV
(July 19, 2016), https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2016/
CCDEC201612.pdf.
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shown to help parties settle even when they did not think that was
possible.141
Second, as mediation becomes expected and thus the norm, the
shadow of this process could help parties and their lawyers become even
more adept at the kinds of conversations and early interventions that are
needed to resolve disputes. Stakeholders will need to be included. Interests
and options, in addition to legal rights and responsibilities, will be on the
agenda. Parties will need to consent to any resolution. And implementation
and compliance will be more likely. Changing the practice and expectations
of ISDS to focus on the consensual process of mediation rather than the
adversarial process of arbitration will increase the utility of all early and
consensual conflict management systems.
And, finally, the threat of an impending mandatory mediation might
just push parties to agree to stakeholder negotiation sooner rather than later.
Knowing that mediation will occur and what it will entail, lead agencies
under SIRMs, or even investors themselves, will be better able to persuade
recalcitrant participants to sit down and resolve the dispute. In some in-
stances, the lead agency might actually serve as the de facto mediator (or at
least the convener) of the stakeholder negotiation.
For all who believe in the benefits of FDI, the overriding goal is more
efficient, more effective, relationship-enhancing resolutions of the disputes
that will almost inevitably arise between investors and states. For all who
believe in mediation, it is time to notice the beneficial and usefully coercive
power of its shadow.
141. See Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the
Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565, 582 (1997)
(finding that parties in a study who were referred to mandatory mediation “did not differ from
those who chose to mediate in their ratings of the importance of various reasons for reaching or
not reaching a settlement”).
